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Abstract 
[Excerpt] In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the arbitration and mediation of 
employment disputes outside the collective bargaining context. This increase has been part of a larger 
shift from reliance on litigation and enforcement agency resolution of disputes to the use of alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR), a trend particularly evident in the employment field. Over the course of several 
decades employees have gained a long list of rights and protections included in a variety of laws, ranging 
from anti-discrimination statutes to pension safeguards to statutory attempts to guarantee safer and 
healthier workplaces. The growing use of arbitration, mediation, and related techniques to resolve 
statutory claims arising in employment relations is in part the consequence of the high costs and long 
delays associated with the use of administrative agencies and the court system to resolve disputes. The 
unpredictability of jury awards has also prompted employers and employees to opt for ADR. 
The growing use of ADR in employment disputes has occurred both inside and outside collective 
bargaining. In some union workplaces, the parties attempt to resolve statutory claims using the grievance 
and arbitration procedures in the collective bargaining agreement. In others, many, if not most, statutory 
claims are handled outside the collective bargaining arena, with employees pursuing their claims through 
the normal channels of agency and judicial resolution. In a minority but growing number of union-
management relationships, the parties have created procedures for resolving statutory claims that are 
separate or “sheltered” from the collective bargaining agreement (Dunlop and Zack, 1997, particularly pp. 
53–72; see also Zack, 1999, pp. 67–94). 
The growing use of arbitration and mediation to resolve employment disputes has been especially 
noteworthy in the nonunion sector. In the United States, as most people know, the proportion of the 
workforce that is unionized has been steadily declining for over forty years and currently stands at about 
14 percent. Although the membership in the Canadian labor movement has not suffered as steep a 
decline, a similar trend is apparent there. As in organized workplaces, the growth of employment ADR in 
the nonunion sector is one consequence of employers’ attempts to avoid the high costs and long delays 
of the judicial and administrative routes. Of course, some nonunion employers are also motivated by a 
desire to provide their employees with fair and equitable dispute resolution procedures (Bingham and 
Chachere, 1999, pp. 95–135). 
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A Survey of the National Academy of Arbitrators 
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1 
The Rise of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the 
arbitration and mediation of employment disputes outside the 
collective bargaining context. This increase has been part of a 
larger shift from reliance on litigation and enforcement agency 
resolution of disputes to the use of alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR), a trend particularly evident in the employment field. Over 
the course of several decades employees have gained a long list of 
rights and protections included in a variety of laws, ranging from 
anti-discrimination statutes to pension safeguards to statutory 
attempts to guarantee safer and healthier workplaces. The growing 
use of arbitration, mediation, and related techniques to resolve 
statutory claims arising in employment relations is in part the 
consequence of the high costs and long delays associated with the 
use of administrative agencies and the court system to resolve 
disputes. The unpredictability of jury awards has also prompted 
employers and employees to opt for ADR. 
The growing use of ADR in employment disputes has occurred 
both inside and outside collective bargaining. In some union 
workplaces, the parties attempt to resolve statutory claims using the 
grievance and arbitration procedures in the collective bargaining 
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agreement. In others, many, if not most, statutory claims are 
handled outside the collective bargaining arena, with employees 
pursuing their claims through the normal channels of agency and 
judicial resolution. In a minority but growing number of union-
management relationships, the parties have created procedures 
for resolving statutory claims that are separate or “sheltered” from 
the collective bargaining agreement (Dunlop and Zack, 1997, 
particularly pp. 53–72; see also Zack, 1999, pp. 67–94). 
The growing use of arbitration and mediation to resolve employ-
ment disputes has been especially noteworthy in the nonunion 
sector. In the United States, as most people know, the proportion 
of the workforce that is unionized has been steadily declining for 
over forty years and currently stands at about 14 percent. Although 
the membership in the Canadian labor movement has not suffered 
as steep a decline, a similar trend is apparent there. As in organized 
workplaces, the growth of employment ADR in the nonunion 
sector is one consequence of employers’ attempts to avoid the high 
costs and long delays of the judicial and administrative routes. Of 
course, some nonunion employers are also motivated by a desire 
to provide their employees with fair and equitable dispute resolu-
tion procedures (Bingham and Chachere, 1999, pp. 95–135). 
Most observers believe there has been a “litigation explosion” in 
the United States that began in the 1960s and, some contend, 
continues to this day. An estimated 30 million civil cases are now on 
the dockets of federal, state, and local courts, a number that has 
grown dramatically in recent years, and a significant proportion of 
these cases involve employment law. In the last quarter century, the 
number of suits filed in federal courts concerning employment 
matters grew by more than 400 percent (Commission on the 
Future of Worker-Management Relations, 1994, pp. 25–33). The 
clogged dockets of federal and state courts, and also of administra-
tive agencies such as the EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission) in the U.S., have led to longer and longer delays and 
excessive costs. In addition, new federal statutes have expanded 
individual employment rights in the workplace, thus adding to the 
potential for further clogging of the administrative agencies and 
courts. 
In theory, using arbitration and mediation to resolve employ-
ment disputes is a means of circumventing the expensive, time-
consuming features of conventional litigation. These dispute 
resolution processes are not usually confined by the legal rules that 
govern court proceedings, such as those governing the admissibil-
ity of evidence and the examination of witnesses. Arbitrators, for 
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example, may conduct expedited hearings, dispense with briefs, 
consider hearsay evidence, and allow advocates to lead their 
witnesses. Discovery is almost never a part of the mediation process 
and is often limited in arbitration. The parties, in both union and 
nonunion relationships, have significantly more control over an 
arbitration or mediation process than they would over a court or 
agency proceeding. Within broad limits, the parties can design the 
dispute resolution procedure themselves. Because the disputants 
usually select the neutral, they are likely to have more trust and 
confidence in the neutral’s ability than they would in a judge or 
agency officer assigned to hear the case. Moreover, it is widely 
believed that compliance with the eventual settlement is less likely 
to be a problem when the disputants have controlled the process 
that produced the outcome. 
The use of ADR in employment disputes involving statutory 
rights has been approved by courts in both the United States and 
Canada. Most notably, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 
U.S. 20 (1991), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a stockbroker 
who had agreed to the New York State Stock Exchange’s rule 
requiring arbitration of employment disputes between brokers 
and member firms could not sue his employer for an alleged 
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act but instead 
must arbitrate the dispute. Since Gilmer, most federal appellate 
courts in the U.S. have applied the principle in that case to other 
industries and a variety of employment statutes. Encouraged by 
Gilmer and its progeny, a growing number of nonunion employers 
have required their employees—as a condition of their hiring or 
continued employment—to agree to use arbitration to resolve 
statutory complaints rather than resorting to the courts. This form 
of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreement has proven to be 
very controversial. A federal commission appointed by the Clinton 
administration and headed by former Secretary of Labor John 
Dunlop condemned its use (Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations, 1994, pp. 25–33). On the other hand, 
defenders of such agreements argue that, if the process is properly 
designed, both employers and employees have the advantage 
of a fast, fair, and inexpensive means of resolving complaints 
(Sherwyn and Tracey, pp. 73–150; U.S. General Accounting Of-
fice, 1997, pp. 38–41). 
Canadian arbitrators have long been mandated, by the decision 
of the Supreme Court of Canada in MacLeod v. Egan (1974), 46 
D.L.R. (3d) 150; [1975] 1 S.C.R. 517, to interpret and apply statutes 
that relate to provisions in collective bargaining agreements, 
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under a judicial review standard of correctness. A more recent 
Supreme Court of Canada decision, Weber v. Ontario Hydro (1995), 
125 D.L.R. (4th) 583; [1975] 2 S.C.R. 929, holds that under a 
collective bargaining regime arbitrators, and not the courts, have 
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the constitutional, statutory, 
and common-law rights of employees in disputes that flow from the 
collective bargaining agreement. Several subsequent reported 
awards in Canada involve boards of arbitration under collective 
bargaining agreements taking jurisdiction of claims in negligence 
and defamation cases, and granting remedies, including aggra-
vated damages, previously available only in the courts. 
Although there may be many advantages to the use of mandatory 
arbitration in employment disputes, some observers contend that 
these processes also present serious problems in achieving fairness 
and equity for the disputants. While employment contracts have 
been arbitrated without great controversy for years, many observ-
ers are concerned about the more recent use of ADR to resolve 
statute-based employment disputes in the nonunion sector. In the 
absence of unions or other forms of employee representation, it is 
the employer that designs, implements, and (ordinarily) pays for 
the dispute resolution procedure. Whether employers, acting 
entirely on their own discretion, give sufficient regard to due 
process considerations in their design and use of ADR procedures 
remains an open question and one that has been the subject of 
much litigation in recent years (Zack, 1999, particularly pp. 77–89). 
The Response of the Academy to the Rise of ADR 
All of the developments sketched above have had significant— 
and possibly dramatic—effects on the practice of arbitration. 
Arbitrators are increasingly being given responsibilities that would 
have been unimaginable at the dawn of arbitration, more than fifty 
years ago, when labor arbitrators resolved disputes between em-
ployers and unions concerning the interpretation or application of 
their collective bargaining agreements. The controversies sur-
rounding the rise of employment arbitration have generated 
debates within the National Academy of Arbitrators, the premier 
organization of labor arbitrators in North America. 
As the Academy moves into the new millennium, changes in the 
law of the workplace, in both the union and nonunion sectors, and 
the response of the courts to the arbitral process will substantially 
influence the evolving practice of arbitration. Inevitably, the evo-
lution of the practice of arbitration will affect a wide range of 
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Academy interests, including its admissions policies, training pro-
grams, and ongoing services to members. 
The Academy has responded in a preliminary fashion to the 
changing realities of employment relations through its endorse-
ment of the “Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration 
of Statutory Disputes Arising out of the Employment Relation-
ship.” The Due Process Protocol was developed by a task force 
consisting of representatives from the Academy, the Labor and 
Employment Law Section of the American Bar Association, the 
American Arbitration Association, the Society of Professionals in 
Dispute Resolution, the U.S. Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service, the National Employment Lawyers Association, and the 
American Civil Liberties Union. The task force debated the ques-
tion of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements as a condi-
tion of employment but did not “achieve consensus on this difficult 
issue,” other than to agree that such agreements should be know-
ingly made. 
The task force did, however, agree on a set of “standards of 
exemplary due process,” including the right of employees in 
arbitration and mediation cases to be represented by a spokesper-
son of their own choosing, employer reimbursement of at least a 
portion of employees’ attorney fees, especially for lower-paid 
employees, and “adequate” employee access to “all information 
reasonably relevant to mediation and/or arbitration of their claims.” 
The Due Process Protocol also calls for the use of qualified and 
impartial arbitrators and mediators drawn from rosters that are 
diversified on the basis of gender, ethnicity, background, and 
experience. To guarantee an adequate supply of qualified neutrals, 
the protocol calls for “the development of a training program to 
educate existing and potential labor and employment mediators 
and arbitrators.” (See Due Process Protocol, p . 45 of this report*; 
see also the discussion in Dunlop and Zack, pp. 93–118.) 
Concerned that unfair procedures in employment arbitration 
and the involuntary pre-dispute exclusion of employees from 
access to the courts and regulatory agencies was tainting the image 
of all workplace arbitration, the Academy went on record at its 50th 
annual meeting (in Chicago, May 1997) as being opposed to the 
mandatory arbitration of the statutory rights of employees as a 
*[Editor’s Note: The Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory 
Disputes Arising out of the Employment Relationship was reprinted at the end of 
this report, but it has not been reprinted here. The text of the Protocol is available at 
<http://www.naarb.org/protocol.html>. 
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condition of employment where such schemes preclude recourse 
to the courts and statutory tribunals. Recognizing that such arbitra-
tions are nevertheless lawful, as confirmed by Gilmer, at the same 
meeting the Academy promulgated guidelines to assist its mem-
bers in conducting employment arbitrations that involve statutory 
rights. The guidelines strive to ensure fairness and due process, 
giving the fullest scope to the procedural protections, evidentiary 
burdens, and remedies available under the statutes themselves. To 
further its interest in protecting the integrity of the arbitration 
process the Academy has also intervened as amicus curiae in a 
number of court cases involving the application and refinement of 
Gilmer. 
2 
The Survey of the 
National Academy of Arbitrators 
The Need for a Survey 
Although the Academy has taken such significant steps as estab-
lishing guidelines and endorsing the Due Process Protocol, it has 
acted on the basis of only anecdotal or dated information about the 
extent and nature of the actual professional activities and goals of 
its members. (Since its inception in 1947, the Academy has con-
ducted, so far as we can determine, seven previous surveys of its 
members; these are listed in the References section.) In unionized 
settings, for example, the Academy needs empirical data on cases 
in which arbitrators are called upon to adjudicate statutory rights 
under the terms of collective bargaining agreements. Prior to this 
survey, we lacked current data on the frequency of such cases, the 
types of statutory rights involved, the procedural and evidentiary 
rules applied, and the scope of remedial jurisdiction exercised by 
the arbitrators. 
To what extent do the parties to collective bargaining agree-
ments vest labor arbitrators with jurisdiction over employment-
related statutory rights? If the parties pursue that option, do they 
incorporate the full scope of statutory remedial authority as part of 
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the arbitrator’s jurisdiction? Have the arbitrators who hear statu-
tory claims under collective bargaining contracts received educa-
tion or training in the relevant statutes? Are these arbitrators 
familiar with the standards stipulated in the Due Process Protocol 
and do they apply them? On these and other matters of fundamen-
tal interest to the National Academy of Arbitrators and to the 
practice of arbitration in general, there is a need for an up-to-date 
body of empirical knowledge. 
Of equal significance to the Academy, and to the practice of 
dispute resolution generally, is information regarding Academy 
members who have been serving as arbitrators or mediators in 
nonunion employment disputes. The Academy needs to be aware 
of the extent to which its members—one of the most important 
groups of arbitrators in North America—have moved into the 
burgeoning field of ADR beyond collective bargaining. How many 
labor arbitrators have undertaken the arbitration or mediation of 
nonunion cases? How many have moved outside the workplace to 
serve as mediators or arbitrators of commercial, environmental, 
product liability, or other types of disputes? 
When labor arbitrators expand their practice into nonunion 
areas, what due process standards and procedural safeguards do 
they apply in these cases? To what extent do arbitrators in all types 
of cases use pre-hearing discovery and require the exchange of 
documents? To what extent do arbitrators’ hearings involve repre-
sentation of the disputants by advocates, the use of sworn testi-
mony, and the use of transcripts? Outside collective bargaining, to 
what extent are written and reasoned decisions encouraged or 
discouraged? What percentage of the union or nonunion cases 
handled by labor arbitrators originate in private, agency, or court 
referral? What are the sources and methods of the remuneration 
of arbitrators? What factors are related to arbitrator rates of 
remuneration? 
Gaining empirical knowledge on these critical questions is 
essential for the Academy in making decisions on its current 
policies and future directions. For example, benchmark data 
would be useful in designing training initiatives and in assessing 
the future growth or decline of Academy members’ involvement in 
nonunion arbitration or mediation. There has been no current 
information on the extent to which Academy members are familiar 
with or tend to apply the standards enumerated in the Due Process 
Protocol and the Academy’s own Guidelines. By signing the Due 
Process Protocol and promulgating its Guidelines, however, the 
Academy has pledged itself to vigilantly promote and protect 
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fairness and due process in the activities of its members in the 
mediation and arbitration of employment-related disputes. There 
can be no informed vigilance, however, in the absence of a base of 
knowledge. 
Survey Methodology 
In 1998 the Academy decided to undertake a new survey of its 
members and assigned responsibility for the survey to its Commit-
tee on Employment-Related Dispute Resolution, chaired by the 
senior author of this report. The Academy also commissioned the 
Cornell/PERC Institute on Conflict Resolution at Cornell Univer-
sity to supervise the design, implementation, and analysis of the 
survey, working in association with the ERDR Committee. A joint 
Academy-Cornell team was formed consisting of members of the 
ERDR Committee and faculty and staff from the Institute on 
Conflict Resolution and the Computer-Assisted Survey Team 
(CAST), Cornell’s survey research unit. 
Design of the survey instrument began in the fall of 1998. The 
joint team met in Boston on December 4 to review the purposes 
and objectives of the survey and to set out a schedule of work. 
Development of the instrument continued through December 
and into January of 1999. A focus group of Academy members was 
formed and a draft survey was administered to members of this 
group on January 16 and 17. Feedback from this group led to 
further revisions of the instrument, and a pilot test was conducted 
on 23 randomly selected Academy members between January 25 
and February 1. After further revisions in the instrument on the 
basis of the pilot, the full-scale survey was launched on February 5 
and completed on May 1. Altogether there were about 30 iterations 
of the survey instrument before the final form was adopted for use 
in the full survey. 
The sample for the survey was the entire membership of the 
National Academy of Arbitrators. As of January 1999, the Academy 
had a total of 599 members. Not all Academy members, however, 
are actively engaged in the practice of arbitration. Eligibility for 
inclusion in the survey was determined by whether the Academy 
respondent had either arbitrated or mediated any type of case 
during the years 1996–98. Respondents were offered three options 
for completing the survey: to complete a mailed questionnaire and 
return it by mail, to participate in a telephone survey using a CATI 
(computer-assisted telephone interviewing) system, or to com-
plete a faxed questionnaire. 
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9% Declined 
— / 
5% No response 
86% Completed 
the survey 
Figure 1 
Response rate among the 535 Academy members 
eligible to participate in the survey 
Of the 599 Academy members, 64 (11 percent) were deemed 
ineligible because they had not arbitrated or mediated in the 
previous three years. Another 25 Academy members did not 
respond to the survey and could not otherwise be reached. Forty-
eight members declined to participate. Completed surveys were 
obtained from 462 Academy members, 77 percent of the total 
membership and 86 percent of those deemed eligible to partici-
pate (see figure 1). Of those completing the survey, 274 did so by 
telephone interview and 188 by either mail or fax. The mean (or 
average) length of a telephone interview was 31 minutes. Needless 
to say, an 86 percent response rate is an extraordinary result, 
significantly higher than the norm for surveys of this type. Because 
of the high response rate, we use the terms “respondents” and 
“Academy members” interchangeably in this report. 
3 
A Profile of Academy Members 
Age and full-time status. The average Academy member is 63 years 
old, has been an arbitrator for 26 years, has been a member of the 
Academy for 16 years, and earned 76 percent of his or her income 
during 1996–98 from work as a neutral. Table 1 gives a more 
detailed age distribution for Academy members. About 10 percent 
of Academy members are under age 50, while nearly 7 percent are 
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over age 80. About a fifth of the Academy members reported that 
they do not engage in full-time work activity. The age distribution 
of “full-time” neutrals—defined as those working full time and 
earning 90 percent or more of their income from work as a 
neutral—is slightly different, as table 1 shows. The average age of 
full-time neutrals is 61. 
Gender and race. Figure 2 shows the distribution of Academy 
members by gender and race. Only 12 percent of Academy mem-
bers are women and less than 6 percent are nonwhite. A signifi-
cantly greater proportion of women members are full-time neutrals 
(66.1 percent) than men (47.4 percent). On the other hand, a 
higher proportion of whites are full-time neutrals than nonwhites. 
On average, the female members of the Academy are younger 
(mean age of 56) than the males (mean age of 64). 
Education. As table 2 shows, 61.4 percent of Academy members 
reported having a law or J.D. degree. Most of the remaining 
Academy members have either a master’s degree (12.6 percent) or 
a doctorate (22 percent). Further analysis suggests that the mem-
bers’ level and type of education is not related to their age. On the 
other hand, there is some relation between education and gender 
as shown by table 2. Relatively more men than women have law 
degrees and Ph.D.s. 
Experience as a neutral. The average Academy member has served 
as an arbitrator for 26 years; the range for this variable is from 7 to 
59 years. The average Academy member has also served as a 
mediator for 15 years. About 49 percent of Academy members 
reported serving as union-management mediators in the 1996–98 
Table 1 
Age Distribution of 
Age No. 
Under 50 47 
50 to 59 155 
60 to 69 118 
70 to 79 100 
80 to 89 30 
90 or over 1 
Academy Members 
% of all 
respondents 
10.4 
34.4 
26.2 
22.2 
6.7 
0.2 
% of full-time 
neutrals* 
14.8 
35.9 
26.5 
18.8 
4.0 
0.0 
*A “full-time neutral” is defined as a respondent who 
reported both that he or she was engaged in full-time 
work and that 90 percent or more of his or her in-
come was derived from work as a neutral. 
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88% Male 
3.5% Other 
94% 
European/ 
White 
2.5% African 
American/Black 
Gender Race 
Figure 2 
Gender and race distribution of Academy members 
Table 2 
Distribution of Academy Members 
Degree 
Bachelor’s 
or less 
Master’s 
Law degree 
Doctorate 
All members 
No. % 
18 
58 
282 
101 
3.0 
12.6 
61.4 
22.0 
by Education 
No. 
14 
43 
250 
94 
Men 
% 
3.5 
10.7 
62.5 
23.3 
Wo 
No. 
4 
15 
30 
7 
men 
% 
7.1 
26.8 
53.6 
12.5 
Note: Of the 462 respondents, 3 failed to provide information re-
garding their education. 
period. Of those who have served as mediators, the range is from 
1 to 57 years. 
The average respondent has been a member of the Academy for 
16 years, as table 3 shows. A handful have been members since the 
Academy’s founding in 1947. Those who work part time, not 
surprisingly, are the oldest and most experienced members of the 
Academy. We did a further analysis of the relationship between the 
work activity of Academy members and their education and full- or 
part-time status, which is shown in table 4. In relative terms, lawyers 
tend to be full-time practitioners, either as full-time neutrals or as 
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Table 3 
Experience in the Field (means for each category) 
Years as 
NAA member 
Full-time neutral 15.2 
Full-time worker, 14.2 
part-time neutral 
Part-time worker 21.0 
Total 16.0 
Years as 
mediator 
15.3 
14.7 
13.0 
14.7 
Years as 
arbitrator 
24.0 
25.4 
30.3 
25.6 
Age 
60.4 
59.8 
73.0 
62.6 
Date of 
highest 
degree 
1967 
1967 
1956 
1965 
Table 4 
Work Activity of Academy Members by Education 
Full-time Full-time work, Part-time 
neutral part-time neutral work Total 
High school 
Bachelor’s 
Master’s 
Law degree 
Doctorate 
Total 
No. 
8 
37 
151 
31 
227 
% 
3.5 
16.3 
66.5 
13.7 
No. 
2 
7 
81 
46 
136 
% 
1.5 
5.1 
59.6 
33.8 
No. 
2 
5 
13 
46 
21 
87 
% 
2.3 
5.7 
14.9 
52.9 
24.1 
No. 
2 
15 
57 
278 
98 
450 
% 
0.4 
3.3 
12.7 
61.8 
21.8 
neutrals who also maintain a law practice. Academy members with 
a doctorate, on the other hand, are much more likely to engage in 
neutral work on a part-time basis. Many of these members hold full-
time teaching positions. 
Income and work activity. We asked Academy members to tell us 
what percentage of their income was generated by their work as a 
neutral and what percentage from other kinds of work activity. On 
average, respondents reported that they earned 76 percent of their 
income (not including any investment or retirement income) 
from their work as either an arbitrator or mediator. On average, 
they reported earning 14 percent of their income from a college or 
university and 4 percent from the practice of law. Not surprisingly, 
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the percentage of income an Academy member earned from his or 
her practice as a neutral was significantly related to whether the 
respondent worked full time or part time. This relationship is 
shown in table 5. For example, those respondents who reported 
working full time as a neutral also reported earning virtually all (99 
percent) of their income from their practice as a neutral. Those 
working full time but only part time as a neutral reported earning 
37 percent of their income from their work as a neutral. 
The proportion of their income the respondents earned as a 
neutral also depended on the type of education they received. 
Academy members with a bachelor’s or master’s degree tend to 
earn a higher proportion of their income from their work as a 
neutral, as table 6 shows. Lawyers in the Academy are slightly less 
dependent on their work as a neutral for their livelihood: about 78 
percent of their income is from this source. Members who have 
Ph.D.s earn 65 percent of their income from their practice as a 
neutral and over 28 percent from a college or university, reflecting 
the fact that many of these individuals hold full- or part-time faculty 
appointments. 
There is also a relationship between the proportion of income 
an Academy member earns from his or her practice and the 
member’s age. As table 7 shows, those members who are under 70 
have a wider range of sources of income than those who are over 
70. It seems clearly to be the case that retirement from other work 
activity affects this relationship. Academy members who hold 
academic appointments tend to lean more heavily on their work as 
neutrals after they retire from college or university faculties. 
Table 5 
Sources of Income for Academy Members (percent) 
Full-time neutral 
Full-time worker, 
part-time neutral 
Part-time worker 
Total 
Work as 
neutral 
99 
37 
80 
76 
College or 
university 
0 
41 
5 
14 
Note: Row totals in this and subsequent tables 
Law 
practice 
0 
10 
6 
4 
may not add 
Writing 
0 
2 
1 
1 
Training Other 
0 0 
1 9 
0 9 
1 5 
to 100 because of rounding. 
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Table 6 
Percentage of Academy Members’ Income from Various Sources, by 
Education 
Education 
High school 
Bachelor’s 
Master’s 
Law degree 
Doctorate 
Table 7 
Percentage 
Age 
Under 50 
50–59 
60–69 
70–79 
80 or over 
No. 
2 
16 
58 
280 
100 
Work as 
neutral 
100 
90.3 
84.5 
77.9 
64.8 
College or 
university 
— 
5.6 
5.2 
10.6 
28.4 
Law 
practice 
— 
— 
0.7 
6.4 
1.5 
Writing 
— 
— 
0.3 
0.7 
1.0 
Training 
— 
— 
0.4 
0.7 
1.5 
Other 
— 
— 
9.0 
4.4 
3.8 
of Academy Members’ Income from Various Sources, by Age 
No. 
47 
155 
116 
99 
31 
Work as 
neutral 
84.5 
71.5 
74.2 
83.5 
75.5 
College or 
university 
6.7 
20.4 
16.5 
4.9 
5.7 
Law 
practice 
4.3 
3.1 
4.4 
5.7 
7.3 
Writing 
0.7 
1.2 
0.3 
0.5 
0.3 
Training 
1.3 
0.8 
1.5 
0 
0.3 
Other 
2.6 
3.0 
4.8 
6.3 
11.0 
4 
Academy Members’ Caseloads 
in Union-Management Relations 
All members of the Academy, of course, have the core of their 
practice in union-management arbitration. Our findings imply 
that the 462 respondents to our survey arbitrated over 74,000 cases 
of all kinds during the period 1996–98. In addition, Academy 
members mediated over 7,000 cases of all kinds during the same 
period. About half the respondents (49 percent) reported that 
they had mediated at least one union-management dispute during 
the preceding three years. The average member of the Academy 
arbitrated 160 cases and mediated 15 during the period 1996–98. 
The average yearly caseload for Academy members would there-
fore be about 55. 
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Union-management arbitration. There is significant variation in the 
labor arbitration caseload across the membership, however. Fig-
ure 3 shows the caseload distribution. Eighteen respondents (about 
4 percent of the total number), for example, reported rendering 
decisions in 500 or more union-management arbitration cases 
during the 1996–98 period. At the other end of the spectrum, 69 
respondents (15 percent of the total) told us they had rendered 
decisions in fewer than 50 cases during the same period. On 
average, a significant proportion of an Academy member’s caseload 
is in the public sector—38 percent—although the range is very 
wide. Some members, about 10 percent, said they had done no 
work in the public sector during the 1996–98 period, while others, 
also about 10 percent, reported doing virtually all of their work in 
the public sector. About 88 percent of the Academy respondents 
told us they had arbitrated at least one local government case 
during the three years that preceded our survey. 
Academy members told us that the vast majority of the union-
management cases they arbitrated were rights, or grievance, dis-
putes, and not many were interest disputes. On average, an Acad-
emy member reported hearing 7 interest disputes in the 1996–98 
period, about 4 percent of the typical respondent’s caseload. A 
majority of the respondents, however, reported that they had 
rendered no decisions at all in interest dispute cases over the 
preceding three years. 
Figure 3 
Three-Year Union-Management Arbitration Caseload of Academy 
Members 
160 
140 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 3.9% 
0–49 50–99 100–199 200–299 300–399 400–499 500+ 
Number of Cases 
282 ARBITRATION 2000 
Union-management mediation. Since the inception of the Acad-
emy, the mediation of union-management disputes has been an 
important activity for a significant number of Academy members. 
The rise of collective bargaining in the public sector, especially 
during the 1960s and 1970s, created new opportunities for Acad-
emy members and other neutrals to engage in union-management 
mediation. We asked Academy members to report the number of 
union-management disputes in which they had been designated to 
serve as mediators. Figure 4 summarizes the answers to our query. 
It shows that about half the members did not engage in union-
management mediation during the 1996–98 period. Of the half 
that did, about 80 percent (40.7 percent of all respondents) told us 
they had mediated 25 or fewer cases during the preceding three 
years. (One respondent mediated more than 200 cases during 
1996–98.) Academy members also reported that nearly 6 out of 10 
cases (58.9 percent) they mediated were public sector cases. Recall 
that 38 percent of the Academy’s union-management arbitration 
caseload is in the public sector. 
In the previous three years, 57 percent of the Academy’s mem-
bers reported mediating at least one case involving local govern-
ment. Thirty-nine percent had mediated at least one state or 
provincial case and 19 percent reported mediating one or more 
Figure 4 
Three-Year Union-Management Mediation Caseload of Academy 
Members (1996–98) 
220 
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federal cases. Otherwise, the mediation caseload is centered in 
transportation, communications, and utilities (34 percent) and 
manufacturing (30 percent). 
The average caseloads discussed above mask important differ-
ences across members of the Academy. We examined average 
caseloads across a number of different demographic variables. 
There were no significant differences in either mediation or 
arbitration caseloads between men and women. When we looked 
at two other variables, region of residence and age, however, we 
found reasonably large differences in the number of cases heard. 
These results are presented in Tables 8 and 9. Arbitrators in the 
northeastern U.S. and in Canada have heard significantly more 
cases than those in the rest of the United States. Northeastern 
members also have conducted slightly more labor-management 
mediations than have the other members of the Academy. As we 
will see later, this workload discrepancy in part reflects differences 
in the composition of a member’s practice. Residents of the 
western U.S., for example, tend to have smaller labor-management 
caseloads but larger nonunion and nonemployment caseloads 
than the remainder of the Academy members. 
We also detected, not surprisingly, that caseloads decline 
with age. Table 9 presents average caseloads by age groups. Acad-
emy members under the age of 50 have the highest arbitration and 
mediation caseloads, 207 arbitrations and 22 mediations on aver-
age in the 1996–98 period. Caseloads decline steadily among the 
older members of the Academy with those in their 70s hearing 146 
arbitrations and 6 mediations during the same period. 
Table 8 
Union-Management Caseload by Region (means, 1996–98) 
Northeast, U.S. 
North central, U.S. 
West, U.S. 
Elsewhere, U.S. 
Canada 
No. 
142 
119 
67 
105 
27 
Arbitration 
cases 
194 
155 
144 
132 
171 
Mediation 
cases 
13 
10 
10 
9 
10 
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Table 9 
Union-Management Caseload by Age (means, 1996–98) 
Under 50 
50-59 
60–69 
70-79 
80+ 
No. 
47 
155 
117 
99 
31 
Arbitration 
cases 
207 
169 
159 
146 
74 
Mediation 
cases 
22 
13 
8 
6 
3* 
*Mean is 11 if one respondent reporting 200+ cases is 
included in calculation. 
5 
To What Extent Have 
Academy Members Moved into ADR? 
To what extent has the rise of ADR led Academy members to 
move into the arbitration or mediation of disputes outside the 
union-management arena? Our survey results suggest that mem-
ber experience as a neutral outside collective bargaining is reason-
ably extensive but not very intensive. Of the Academy members 
responding to the survey regarding their experience during the 
period 1996–98, 
• 46 percent arbitrated one or more nonunion employment 
disputes. 
• 23 percent mediated one or more nonunion employment 
disputes. 
• 25 percent arbitrated one or more nonemployment disputes. 
• 16 percent mediated one or more nonemployment disputes. 
In our survey, we probed those respondents who had not 
engaged in neutral work outside of union-management relations 
to find out under what circumstances, if any, they would accept a 
nonunion case. Table 10 summarizes Academy members’ attitudes 
about accepting nonunion arbitration and mediation work. It 
shows that at least 30 percent of the members would do nonunion 
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mediation and arbitration work if there were acceptable due 
process protections. Those Academy members who have not en-
tered the ADR arena appear to be somewhat more interested in 
undertaking the mediation of nonunion employment disputes 
than other forms of neutral activity. 
The third row of table 10 shows that some Academy members 
told us they would accept cases outside union-management rela-
tions depending on the circumstances. We probed respondents to 
discover the circumstances they thought were essential. In most 
cases, the respondents again emphasized that their willingness to 
accept nonunion cases depended on the nature of the due process 
protections in such cases: 
“I’d want to make sure that the arrangement was fair to begin with.” 
“It’s only recently that the Academy and other organizations have 
agreed upon the Due Process Protocol. I wouldn’t consider anything 
that didn’t meet the protocol’s requirements unless I was satisfied 
with the process.” 
“The FMCS and the Academy issued some guidelines that arbitrators 
must take into consideration when taking a nonunion case. If those 
conditions are met, I would accept.” 
Other arbitrators also said that their acceptance of these types of 
cases depended on the scheduling of such cases and their own 
availability. 
Table 10 
Member Attitudes on Accepting Cases Outside Labor-Management Relations 
(percent responding yes) 
Have accepted and 
completed cases 
Would accept 
cases* 
It depends 
Would not accept 
cases 
Declined to answer/ 
don’t know 
Nonunion 
employment 
arbitration 
45.9 
32.9 
12.6 
6.9 
1.7 
Nonunion 
employment 
mediation 
22.7 
39.8 
17.5 
17.3 
2.6 
Nonemployment 
arbitration 
24.7 
30.5 
22.3 
19.9 
2.6 
Nonemployment 
mediation 
15.6 
33.1 
23.4 
25.5 
2.4 
*Respondents were asked whether they would accept such cases “assuming acceptable 
due process protections.” 
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Table 10 also shows the proportion of respondents who told us 
they would not accept cases outside union-management relations; 
about 7 percent of the Academy’s members apparently will not 
agree to arbitrate a nonunion employment case, while over one-
quarter will not accept a nonemployment (commercial, etc.) 
mediation case. 
We asked survey respondents to tell us what types of disputes they 
had handled outside the union-management relations and em-
ployment arenas. Recall that about 25 percent of the Academy had 
arbitrated nonunion and nonemployment cases and 16 percent 
had mediated such cases. Figure 5 summarizes the results of our 
queries, with greater detail given in table 11. The bulk of the work 
Academy members have accepted outside the labor and employ-
ment area is in the commercial category (for example, 76 percent 
of the Academy members who have arbitrated a nonemployment 
case have served in a commercial or contractual dispute). A 
Figure 5 
Most Common Nonemployment Dispute Areas 
Arbitration 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
% 21% 
Commercial 
contract 
Personal Construction/ 
injury securities (tie) 
Mediation 
100 
80 
60 
40 53% 
20 
0 
Commercial 
contract 
Personal 
injury 
Real estate 
Note: Percentages represent members who have served in these dispute areas 
as a proportion of all members who have arbitrated or mediated nonemploy-
ment cases. 
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Table 11 
Types of Nonemployment Disputes in Which Academy Members Served as 
Neutrals, 1996–98 (percentage of respondents) 
Type of dispute 
Commercial/contract 
Financial reorg 
Consumer rights 
Corporate finance 
Environment 
Intellectual property 
Personal injury 
Product liability 
Real estate 
Construction 
Family 
Community 
Health care 
Securities 
Landlord/tenant 
Other 
Respondent 
as arbitrator 
76 
14 
12 
10 
8 
7 
28 
6 
18 
21 
5 
5 
17 
21 
6 
31 
Corporate use 
of arbitration* 
85 
8 
17 
12 
20 
21 
32 
26 
39 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
Respondent 
as mediator 
53 
11 
9 
9 
16 
7 
40 
7 
27 
17 
24 
20 
14 
9 
13 
29 
Corporate use 
of mediation* 
78 
10 
24 
13 
31 
29 
57 
39 
32 
40 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
*These columns are results reported in David B. Lipsky and Ronald L. Seeber, The Appro-
priate Resolution of Corporate Disputes: A Report on the Growing Use of ADR by U.S. Corporations, 
1998, p . 11. 
considerable number of Academy members have also served in 
personal injury, real estate, construction, and health care cases. On 
the other hand, very few Academy members have any experience 
in disputes involving intellectual property, product liability, and 
corporate finance. 
It is interesting to compare NAA member experiences with the 
results we obtained when we surveyed corporate counsel for the 
Fortune 1000 about their experiences in using ADR. The column 
showing corporate use in table 11 represents the proportion of 
corporate respondents who reported using arbitration or media-
tion during 1994–96 in the types of disputes listed. Business use of 
neutrals very closely parallels experiences of NAA members, indi-
cating that Academy members are moving into the available range 
of neutral opportunities. 
We were interested in understanding how Academy members 
obtained their cases, and table 12 displays the various sources of 
referrals. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of Academy respon-
dents reported that, during 1996–98, they had been designated to 
serve as an arbitrator in a union-management case by a private 
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Table 12 
Sources of Case Referrals for Academy Members (percent reporting at least 
one referral) 
Referral 
source 
Private agency 
Direct appointment 
Court referral 
Government agency 
Permanent panel 
Other 
Union-
management 
arbitration 
86 
97 
20 
84 
93 
12 
Union-
management 
mediation 
31 
78 
5 
42 
29 
3 
Nonunion Nonunion 
employment employment 
arbitration 
56 
65 
13 
20 
16 
2 
mediation 
39 
76 
24 
13 
12 
3 
agency referral (86 percent of the respondents answered “yes”; the 
American Arbitration Association and other private providers 
would be included in this category); by direct appointment of the 
parties (97 percent); by a government agency (84 percent; the 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and local and state 
labor relations agencies would be included in this category); and 
by being part of a permanent panel (93 percent). 
As the table shows, however, the pattern of referral sources is 
different for other types of disputes. For example, Academy mem-
bers who have served as mediators in union-management cases 
have obtained this type of work primarily by direct appointment of 
the parties and secondarily through a government agency. Those 
who have served as arbitrators in nonunion cases have obtained 
such cases primarily by direct appointment of the parties but 
secondarily through a private agency. (The AAA and JAMS-
Endispute would be major sources of this type of work.) Most 
members who have mediated nonunion cases have been directly 
appointed by the parties. 
In sum, direct appointment by the parties is the most significant 
means by which most Academy members obtain cases for all types 
of disputes, perhaps reflecting the members’ vast experience and 
the parties’ knowledge of their reputations. Private agencies such 
as the AAA are an important source of both union and nonunion 
arbitration cases, but a much less important source of union and 
nonunion mediation cases. Case referrals through government 
agencies are more important in the union-management relations 
arena than elsewhere. Similarly, being a member of a permanent 
panel is a common experience for union-management arbitrators 
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but not a common experience when they deal with other types of 
disputes. It appears that the channels through which Academy 
members obtain cases outside union-management relations are 
not yet well defined, and the pattern shown in table 12 may change 
in future years. 
Other types of neutral work. Many Academy members have been 
involved in a variety of other types of neutral work. For example, 
almost all members (86 percent) served as a fact-finder in at least 
one dispute during the 1996–98 period. Also, a large majority of 
members (78 percent) told us they had served as a “mediator-
arbitrator” (i.e., they used “med-arb”) at least once during the same 
period. On the other hand, only about 11 percent of the Academy’s 
members also served as an ombudsperson during the previous 
three years and only about 13 percent served as a neutral in a mini-
trial, a form of ADR frequently used in commercial disputes. About 
58 percent have served as a final-offer selector and 24 percent on 
a peer review panel. 
In table 13, we further analyze the amount of other neutral work 
in which Academy members have engaged. There are three roles 
that are closely related to the core practice of Academy members— 
fact-finder, mediator-arbitrator, and final-offer selector. The Acad-
emy members are very likely to have engaged in those activities 
during their careers. They are much less likely to have served as a 
member of a peer review panel, a neutral in a mini-trial, or an 
ombudsperson. Also, it is notable that Academy members who are 
not full-time neutrals are less likely to engage in core activities and 
more likely to have engaged in the more peripheral roles within 
the profession. 
Table 13 
Other Types of Neutral Work: Full-time Neutrals vs. All Others (percentage 
who have ever served in each role) 
Fact-finder 
Mediator-arbitrator 
Final-offer selector 
Member of peer review panel 
Neutral in a mini-trial 
Ombudsperson 
Full-time 
neutral 
90 
82 
66 
16 
12 
9 
All 
others 
83 
73 
50 
32 
13 
12 
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6 
A Practice Typology 
In this section of the report, we divide the Academy respondents 
into five groups, based on the types of neutral work they engaged 
in over the 1996–98 period. These types are significantly different 
from one another, and those differences are associated with 
differences in other behaviors and attitudes. We asked the Acad-
emy members about the number of various kinds of cases in which 
they had served as a neutral during the past three years. Those six 
types of cases—union-management arbitration, union-manage-
ment mediation, nonunion employment arbitration, nonunion 
employment mediation, nonemployment arbitration, and nonem-
ployment mediation—represent all the possibilities for arbitration 
and mediation work. When we divided the Academy population 
into the groups that did each of these kinds of work, it became 
apparent to us that there were very different types of members 
engaged in the different kinds of work. 
We present in table 14 the Academy membership allocated 
across five types of practice, each type constructed on the basis of 
the nature of the respondent’s caseload over the past three years. 
We call respondents in the first type of practice union-management 
arbitrators. This group of members has done no work during the 
past three years outside the primary jurisdiction of the Academy, 
i.e., arbitration in unionized employment settings. Reading across 
the columns, one sees all zeros in the other types of cases. This 
group represents approximately one-quarter of the respondents to 
our survey. We label respondents in the second type union-only 
neutrals. This group has worked outside basic union-management 
arbitration, but has only branched out into union-management 
mediation. They represent a smaller percentage (13 percent) of 
the membership, but are still a sizable minority within the Academy. 
The third group of respondents is workplace neutrals. This group 
of Academy members has conducted either nonunion arbitration 
or mediation in addition to their basic union-management prac-
tice. The workplace neutrals, however, have not served as neutrals 
outside the workplace, with no nonemployment mediation or 
arbitration reported. This group is the largest within the Acad-
emy—140 members or 31 percent of the respondents to the survey. 
Table 14 
Average Caseload by Type of Practice, 1996–98 
Union- Union- Nonunion Nonunion- Non- Non-
management management employment employment employment employment 
No. arbitration mediation arbitration mediation arbitration mediation 
Union-management 117 128.4 
arbitrators 
Union-only 58 129.3 
neutrals 
Workplace 140 184.8 
neutrals 
Union-management 41 156.7 
& nonemployment 
neutrals 
Multineutrals 99 188.9 
0 
23.8 
11.8 
12.5 
14.3 
0 
4.8 
7.8 
0 
6.6 
13.5 
0 0 
5.9 
10.6 
8.3 
17.8 
Note: Average number of cases in each cell were constructed by setting individual respondents to midpoints. For maximum 
values, 20 percent above maximum was used as individual response (i.e., 500+ = 600). 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
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Respondents in the fourth practice type we call union-management 
and nonemployment neutrals. This group has worked outside the 
union-management context, but not in nonunion employment 
settings. They have practices outside employment, however, in 
either arbitration or mediation (e.g., environmental, commercial, 
etc.). This group is the smallest of the five with only 41, or 9 percent, 
of the members reporting practices that fit this type. Respondents 
in the last practice type we have called multineutrals. This group has 
worked not only in the union-management world but also as 
arbitrators and mediators in both nonunion and nonemployment 
settings. This group is about one-fifth of the Academy member-
ship, with 99 individuals fitting this profile. 
We have included the mean number of cases in table 14 for each 
of the categories. Those with the broadest practices (workplace 
neutrals, union-management and nonemployment neutrals, and 
multineutrals) also have the largest practices in terms of cases 
conducted. Those who confine their work solely to the union-
management arena (union-management arbitrators and union-
only neutrals) are the Academy members with the smallest 
practices. They have conducted approximately 30 percent less 
union arbitration than their workplace and multineutral counter-
parts, despite doing no neutral work outside union-management 
relations. 
Despite the widespread activity outside union-management rela-
tions, it is worth noting that the number of union-management 
arbitrations is much larger than even the sum of all the other work 
done by all Academy members. Even multineutrals on average 
conducted a total of only 63 cases outside union-management 
arbitration, compared to 189 within that area of practice. As we 
noted earlier, a large number of Academy members are practicing 
outside union-management relations, but their experience is quite 
thin. For example, among those who have conducted nonunion 
arbitrations, on average they have done so less than three times a 
year. These practice typologies could become more important in 
the future, however, as the growth areas of demand for neutrals are 
outside union-management relations. 
An initial explanation of the data in table 14 might be that there 
really are no differences in practice typologies, but other differ-
ences between the members explain the differences in types of 
caseloads. For example, many Academy members are either part-
time neutrals (due to other work as an academic or an attorney) or 
do not work full time at all, maintaining an arbitration practice as 
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a part-time job. Table 15 explores that proposition. In our survey 
we asked each respondent whether he or she worked full time in 
any activity. We also asked the respective percentages of income 
earned from various activities, including neutral work 
There is some variance in practice typology by full- or part-time 
status of the respondent. Academy members who are part-time 
workers are much more likely to concentrate their neutral work as 
union-management arbitrators and mediators. Full-time workers 
are more likely than the other groups to be workplace neutrals. It 
is interesting to observe that part-time neutrals engaged in full-
time work (e.g., professors and practicing attorneys) are the group 
most likely to have expanded their practice outside employment. 
Part-time employment status is conventionally associated with 
age, with older individuals presumed to lessen gradually their 
commitment and time devoted to work activity. We therefore 
turned to a comparison of age with practice typology to further 
examine that proposition. Table 16 presents the NAA membership 
broken down into age groups and practice typology. Continuing 
with the theme that we developed in table 15, there is a very strong 
correlation between age and type of work. 
The older an NAA member is, the more likely that he or she 
will be solely a union-management arbitrator. This trend is strongly 
apparent in table 16. The youngest category, those under 50 years 
of age, are the group least likely to be only union-management 
arbitrators and most likely to be multineutrals. The oldest 
group (those over 80) are most likely to be union-management 
Table 15 
Practice Typology by Full- and Part-Time Status (percent falling into each type) 
Union-management 
arbitrators 
Union-only 
neutrals 
Workplace 
neutrals 
Union-management 
& nonemployment 
neutrals 
Multineutrals 
Full-time 
neutral 
22 
11 
37 
8 
23 
Full-time worker, 
part-time neutral 
19 
14 
30 
10 
26 
Part-time 
worker 
46 
16 
18 
10 
9 
Total 
26 
13 
31 
9 
21 
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Table 16 
Practice Typology by Age (percent) 
Under 50 
50–59 
60–69 
70–79 
80 or over 
No. 
47 
153 
117 
98 
30 
Union-
management 
arbitrators 
8.5 
15.7 
29.1 
37.8 
46.7 
Union-
only 
neutrals 
14.9 
14.4 
9.4 
13.3 
13.3 
Workplace 
neutrals 
34.0 
31.4 
36.8 
30.6 
10.0 
Union-management 
& nonemployment 
neutrals 
6.4 
8.5 
8.5 
8.2 
16.7 
Multi-
neutrals 
36.2 
30.1 
16.2 
10.2 
13.3 
arbitrators only and least likely to be workplace neutrals. A reason-
ably clear pattern emerges from these data. Older members are less 
likely to work full time, more likely to stick to traditional union-
management arbitration in their neutral practices, and least likely 
to have sought to expand their practices outside union-manage-
ment relations. 
We also hypothesized that expansion of practice outside union-
management relations might be a function of area of residence. 
While it is not universally true, most practices are regionally based. 
In certain areas of the country, the movement to nonunion ADR 
systems and the acceptance of mediation and arbitration outside 
employment has been occurring at a rapid pace. Those NAA 
members who reside in parts of the United States where these 
trends are strong could be much more likely, because of a rise in 
demand for their services, to move into nonunion and nonemploy-
ment work. Table 17 reports the results of our analysis of this 
question. 
We divided the NAA membership into five groups based on area 
of residence. All of the Canadian members are in one group, as it 
was small to begin with (27 members). We broke the United States 
members into four groups: northeast (Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
and all states to the northeast), north central (north of Kentucky, 
east of the Mississippi River, and west of the northeast group), west 
(California, Washington, Oregon, and Nevada), and elsewhere in 
the United States. An inspection of table 17 reveals some differ-
ences by region of residence. Those in Canada and the U.S. West 
Coast are most likely to be multineutrals. Certainly that mirrors 
expectations, at least on the West Coast, that increased demand for 
nonunion and nonemployment services will lead NAA members in 
those regions into those areas of work. Nor is it surprising in 
Canada where mediation has been substantially introduced into 
civil litigation and the practice of ADR has grown, particularly 
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Table 17 
Practice Typology by Region (percent) 
Northeast, 
U.S. 
North central, 
U.S. 
West, U.S. 
Elsewhere, 
U.S. 
Canada 
No. 
161 
89 
65 
113 
27 
Union-
management 
arbitrators 
23.0 
22.5 
23.1 
34.5 
22.2 
Union-
only 
neutrals 
17.4 
14.6 
6.2 
8.8 
11.1 
Workplace 
neutrals 
29.2 
34.8 
33.8 
28.3 
29.6 
Union-management 
& nonemployment 
neutrals 
11.8 
6.7 
1.5 
12.4 
3.7 
Multi-
neutrals 
18.6 
21.3 
35.4 
15.9 
33.3 
among attorneys. Those in the northeastern U.S. and elsewhere in 
the U.S. are the members most likely to stick to union-management 
work, although that is a less strong tendency. A correlate of the first 
observation is apparent here as well, with West Coast members least 
likely to remain in union-management work. 
We also thought that practice typology might be associated with 
the level of education of the respondent. As discussed later in this 
report, nonunion arbitration and mediation are much more likely 
to demand statutory knowledge than other forms of neutral work. 
Thus, it seems that lawyers might be more highly represented in the 
workplace neutral group. The picture presented in table 18, 
however, is not as clear as the hypothesis above. Those with Ph.D.s 
and master’s degrees are the most likely to work only in unionized 
employment settings. Lawyers are no more likely than those with 
Ph.D.s or bachelor’s degrees to be workplace neutrals. However, 
lawyers are significantly more likely to be multineutrals than are 
any other educational group. Perhaps it is easier for lawyers to have 
their skills and knowledge accepted outside the workplace than it 
is for non-lawyers who have specialized in employment matters. 
The conclusions that can be drawn from these data are sugges-
tive and demand more rigorous statistical analysis. But it seems 
reasonably clear that there are strong predictors of the likelihood 
of individual members moving outside union-management neu-
tral work based on full-time status, age, and region of residence. 
Later in this report, we examine statutory rights experiences and 
attitudes of members, showing that practice typology is signifi-
cantly correlated with attitudes held by the members. 
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Table 18 
Practice Typology by Educational Level (percent) 
High school 
Bachelor’s 
Master’s 
Law degree 
Doctorate 
No. 
2 
16 
57 
278 
99 
Union-
management 
arbitrators 
— 
31.3 
35.1 
23.4 
27.3 
Union-
only 
neutrals 
— 
12.5 
14.0 
8.3 
24.2 
Workplace 
neutrals 
50.0 
37.5 
22.8 
32.0 
31.3 
Union-management 
& nonemployment 
neutrals 
— 
— 
14.0 
9.4 
6.1 
Multi-
neutrals 
50.0 
18.8 
14.0 
27.0 
11.1 
Remuneration 
We asked Academy members to tell us the fee rates they charged 
for their work as arbitrators and mediators. We allowed them to 
provide us their rates on either an hourly or daily basis and in either 
U.S. or Canadian dollars. We also asked whether the rate they were 
quoting was a “block fee,” a practice common in Canada. A block 
fee is a fixed amount charged for one or more days of hearing time, 
with no further charge for research and writing time. The block fee 
implicitly includes some allowance for research and writing. We 
asked for the lowest and highest fee rates members had charged for 
their work as arbitrators in the last year, and we asked parallel 
questions regarding their work as mediators. We subsequently 
converted all reported hourly rates into daily rates, multiplying the 
hourly rate by 7.0 hours. We also converted Canadian fee rates to 
U.S. dollars by multiplying Canadian dollars by 0.6507, the ex-
change rate that prevailed as of December 31, 1998. 
It should be noted that 21 percent of the respondents reported 
doing pro bono work as an arbitrator or a mediator within the last 
year. In reporting their fee rates, we asked respondents to disre-
gard any pro bono work they had done. It is of some interest to 
examine how the frequency of Academy members’ pro bono work 
varies by their age, gender, and education. Figure 6 displays the 
results of this analysis. It is clear that a significantly higher propor-
tion of pro bono work is undertaken by the younger members and 
by women in the Academy. Over 35 percent of those under age 50 
have performed pro bono work in the past year, the highest of any 
age group. Women are nearly twice as likely as men to have done 
pro bono work. It is also the case that lawyers are more likely to do 
pro bono work than Ph.D.s. 
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Figure 6 
Percentage of Academy Members Performing Pro Bono Work within Past 
Year, within Age, Gender, and Education Groups 
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Pro bono work is a much less common feature of union-
management disputes than it is of certain other types of dis-
putes. For example, in 1995 the Equal Employment Opportunity 
0 
0 
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Commission adopted policies encouraging the use of mediation to 
resolve charges filed with the agency (U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, 1995; Miller, 1995, pp. 17 and 87). 
The EEOC is relying heavily (but not exclusively) on the willing-
ness of mediators to do pro bono work for the agency. Some federal 
and state agencies have adopted similar policies, and pro bono 
work is also common in some court-annexed ADR systems. It may 
be that younger people who are eager to develop a practice in 
alternative dispute resolution are willing to accept cases on a pro 
bono basis as a means of gaining experience and developing a 
reputation in the field. 
We also analyzed the average rates charged by Academy respon-
dents. It is interesting to note that those Academy members who 
engage in mediation—recall that about half the members do— 
charge higher rates for mediation than is the norm for arbitration. 
The lowest daily rate charged for arbitration was $640 and the 
highest was $851. For mediation, the lowest rate was $854 and the 
highest, $1158. As our subsequent analysis demonstrates, the 
higher rates charged for mediation are in part a consequence of 
the fact that arbitrators who have moved into the mediation of 
disputes outside employment relations (such as commercial, envi-
ronmental, and international disputes) have been able to take 
advantage of the higher prevailing rates offered in these types of 
disputes. 
Obviously, these average fees mask differences between various 
groups within the Academy. It is interesting to analyze these 
differences, as some reflect expected labor market outcomes and 
some do not. In table 19 we present the results of our basic analysis 
of fee differences by some important independent characteristics. 
Part A shows that arbitration rates charged vary somewhat by type 
of education. For example, lawyers generally charge more than do 
members in other educational categories. We see, however, larger 
differentials in the mediation rates, with lawyers charging signifi-
cantly more than any other educational grouping for their services 
as mediators. We suspect that this difference is due in part to the 
surge in demand for lawyers in nonunion mediation and in some 
of the other nonemployment disputes in which lawyers are able to 
transfer their skills and training more easily than Ph.D.s or other 
degree holders. It may also be that when lawyers step outside the 
role of union arbitration they more readily tie their rates to those 
of the lawyers who represent the parties. 
APPENDIX 299 
Table 19 
Average Daily Fees of Academy Members, 1998 (U.S. dollars) 
A. Education 
High school 
Bachelor’s 
Master’s 
Law degree 
Doctorate 
B. Age 
Under 50 
50-59 
60-69 
70-79 
80 or over 
C. Sex 
Male 
Female 
D. Work 
Full-time neutral 
Full-time work, 
part-time neutral 
Part-time work 
E. Years as NAA member 
Under 10 
10-19 
20-29 
30 or over 
F. Years as Arbitrator 
Under 10 
10-19 
20-29 
30–39 
40 or over 
G. Fees by Region 
Northeast, U.S. 
North central, U.S. 
West, U.S. 
Elsewhere, U.S. 
Canada 
Mediation 
Lowest 
755 
705 
942 
709 
754 
939 
826 
854 
588 
824 
1026 
884 
839 
710 
726 
917 
952 
877 
467 
783 
876 
1008 
785 
753 
650 
1243 
882 
955 
Highest 
1020 
927 
1292 
919 
1275 
1235 
1157 
986 
643 
1112 
1465 
1168 
1164 
1055 
1021 
1239 
1239 
1007 
683 
1123 
1167 
1317 
1156 
1106 
908 
1608 
1066 
1319 
Arbitration 
Lowest 
550 
673 
618 
688 
601 
624 
643 
684 
688 
620 
664 
627 
646 
628 
655 
613 
656 
654 
820 
550 
608 
645 
721 
660 
629 
607 
700 
643 
663 
Highest 
600 
831 
845 
949 
751 
921 
926 
914 
856 
668 
887 
901 
906 
828 
765 
851 
921 
840 
951 
700 
874 
901 
870 
888 
905 
727 
1027 
761 
854 
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In other sections of table 19 we examine questions of normal life-
cycle changes over the course of a working life. It is a well-
established fact of labor market analysis that income from work 
grows as one ages, reaches a peak that varies with occupation, and 
then begins to decline. We suspected this would be true for 
arbitrators as well, and the data confirm that pattern. If we first 
examine the arbitration rates of Academy members by age (part 
B), we see that low rates charged increase for each decade from the 
40s to the 70s, and then decline for members over age 80—a 
negligible age category for most occupational analysis but an 
important and sizable group within the Academy. High arbitration 
rates do not behave in such an easily explainable manner, however. 
Peak arbitration rates are charged by the younger members of the 
Academy, with those in their 50s charging higher fees than any 
other category. This appears to be a more normal age-earning 
profile, at least when compared to other occupational groupings. 
Mediation rates, as we have suggested earlier, are even more 
interesting in some ways. A smaller group of Academy members 
engage in mediation, and they charge significantly more than they 
do for their arbitral services. Lowest mediation rates peak in the 
50s, as they do for highest arbitration rates. At the high rate level 
for mediation, however, the highest fees are charged by the 
youngest mediators, and rates decline with each decade of age 
advancement. We suspect that this is due to the fact that the 
youngest members of the Academy are moving into the new areas 
of mediation more easily and rapidly than are the older members 
of the Academy, and these new areas of practice are more 
lucrative. 
Part C of table 19 presents the differences in rates charged by 
men and women within the Academy. Many results of the analysis 
of gender differences within the Academy have been a surprise, 
and the analysis of fees fits that pattern. Women charge signifi-
cantly more for their mediation services than do men—about 25 
percent more at the lowest rate and nearly 30 percent at the highest 
rate. We suspect that this is largely due to the high demand for 
female neutrals within the newer areas of practice, particularly the 
mediation of employment discrimination charges. This finding, 
however, is quite unusual in the wider context of the U.S. economy, 
where women are typically paid less than men in nearly every 
occupation. Arbitration rates reveal that male Academy members 
charge more at the lowest level, and roughly the same at the highest 
levels. 
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In part D we present the means of fees charged by full- and part-
time neutrals. As we noted earlier, we define full-time neutrals as 
those who work full time and derive more than 90 percent of their 
income from neutral work. We also include in this table a compari-
son of full-time neutrals with part-time neutrals and part-time 
workers. The differences here are not striking or surprising. Full-
time neutrals charge slightly more for mediation than do part-time 
neutrals, a pattern repeated for arbitration. 
In part E of table 19, we look at the effect of years of membership 
in the Academy on rates charged. Academy membership is associ-
ated with elite status in the arbitration profession, and would be 
expected to allow members to charge more than other neutrals. 
From the standpoint of fees it would be reasonable to expect 
Academy membership to become even more valuable over time. 
For low mediation rates and high mediation rates, increasing years 
of membership in the Academy does result in higher fees charged 
through 29 years of membership, and then declines after one has 
been a member over 30 years. Low arbitration rates, in contrast, 
continue to increase the longer one has been a member of the 
Academy. High arbitration rates reveal an unexpected pattern in 
which rates ascend as expected, then decline for members with 
more than 20 and less than 30 years of membership, and then 
increase again for the most senior members of the Academy. 
When we look at the more general measure of experience, years 
as an arbitrator (part F), we see a better-behaved age-earnings 
profile, with rates charged in all categories rising with increasing 
experience, peaking at around 30 years as an arbitrator and then 
beginning to decline. Comparison of the information in these 
sections suggests that years as an arbitrator is a more normal and 
consistent predictor of rates than years as an Academy member. 
In the final section of table 19 we examine fees charged in 
different regions of the United States and Canada. Note that these 
are given in U.S. dollars. Even though many arbitrators maintain 
national practices, their rates are probably influenced by the type 
of work they do and where they base their practice. It is interesting 
to note that arbitration rates vary little—at least on the low end of 
the scale—by region, with West Coast arbitrators charging only 
slightly more than the rest of the Academy membership. 
At the high rate level, regional variances are important. West 
Coast arbitrators charge the most, followed by northeastern U.S. 
and Canadian arbitrators. Arbitrators based in the north central 
U.S. and elsewhere in the U.S. charge significantly less. Mediation 
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rates vary widely at both the low and high rate levels. We believe 
that this reflects the more localized nature of the labor market for 
mediators, where regional differences in practice and demand 
influence rates up or down. Again, and even more significantly 
than for arbitration rates, West Coast Academy members charge 
considerably more than other members. Again, Canadian and 
northeastern U.S. mediation rates are in the middle, and north 
central and elsewhere U.S. rates are the lowest. 
There is another interesting facet of the differences across 
members based on practice typology. When we examined fees 
charged by the various practice types, we found that fees varied, 
sometimes by large amounts. Here we present average fees by 
practice type for all NAA members (table 20) and for full-time 
neutrals (table 21). 
When one examines the fee practices of all NAA members in 
table 20, the disparity in fees charged is quite striking. Multineutrals 
charge (or are offered) significantly more than all other categories 
for mediation and arbitration work. In all cases except the low 
arbitration rate, the lowest fees charged are by the union-only 
Table 20 
Average Daily Fees of All Academy Members, 1998, by Practice Typology 
(U.S. dollars) 
Union-management 
arbitrators 
Union-only neutrals 
Workplace neutrals 
Union-management 
& nonemployment 
neutrals 
Multineutrals 
Ratio of high to 
low group 
No. 
108 
55 
130 
38 
93 
Mediation 
Lowest 
— 
634 
916 
704 
1005 
1.59 
Highest 
— 
778 
1182 
883 
1519 
1.95 
Arbitration 
Lowest 
624 
653 
643 
605 
666 
1.10 
Highest 
730 
732 
850 
865 
1075 
1.47 
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Table 21 
Average Daily Fees of Full-Time Neutrals, 1998, by Practice Typology 
(U.S. dollars) 
Union-management 
arbitrators 
Union-only neutrals 
Workplace neutrals 
Union-management 
& nonemployment 
neutrals 
Multineutrals 
Ratio of high to 
low group 
No. 
49 
24 
77 
17 
50 
Mediation 
Lowest 
— 
643 
939 
599 
1058 
1.77 
Highest 
— 
769 
1173 
820 
1495 
1.94 
Arbitration 
Lowest 
635 
619 
682 
560 
669 
1.22 
Highest 
800 
772 
916 
850 
1122 
1.45 
neutrals. The ratios of multineutral fees to the lowest in each 
category vary from a 10 percent premium (lowest arbitration rate 
charged) to 95 percent (highest mediation rate charged). A more 
sophisticated approach to disentangling the reasons behind this 
difference in fee practices would involve trying to separate supply 
and demand forces. On the supply side, the market may reward 
those who diversify their practices and are willing and qualified to 
serve as neutrals in a variety of settings. On the demand side, 
perhaps the market determines who is able to do the wider variety 
of work and offers them higher fees to move into those arenas. The 
variety of options available to multineutrals may allow them to be 
more selective through higher prices for their services. 
Table 21 replicates the analysis of table 20, while restricting the 
sample to those who are full-time neutrals. The results closely 
mirror those found in table 20. Except for the low arbitration fee, 
multineutrals charge a significant premium over all other groups 
for their services. It is not always the union-only neutrals who are 
the lowest in this analysis, however, and workplace neutrals actually 
charge more than multineutrals at the lowest arbitration fee level. 
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7 
Statutory Rights and Due Process 
An important concern of the Academy is the rising importance 
of statutory rights in arbitration cases. It is presumed that there is 
a rise in the prevalence and importance of statutory rights in the 
normal work of Academy members, union-management arbitra-
tion. There is also evidence that statutory rights may be an even 
more important subject of nonunion mediation and arbitration. 
Thus, the move of Academy members and neutrals in general into 
these new arenas suggests a need for neutrals to be expert in the 
content and application of workplace law. This represents a change 
not only for Academy members but for the profession in general. 
Questions naturally arise concerning the preparation and exper-
tise of Academy members as they are called upon to resolve a wider 
scope of disputes, creating expectations beyond the historical 
expectations for arbitrators in the union-management world. 
Accompanying this concern over the rise of statutory rights in 
arbitration is the importance of due process in these new forums. 
The model of union-management arbitration is well established. It 
is widely presumed that unions and management groups are able 
to mutually assure that due process is guaranteed to individuals. 
While the increased arbitration of statutory rights makes these 
considerations more important than in the past, it is still expected 
that the normal tension between union and management will 
provide appropriate incentives and expertise for the protection of 
due process rights. 
Post-Gilmer litigation has shown that it cannot be presumed that 
this respect and mutual assurance of due process will automatically 
move into the nonunion employment dispute resolution world, 
however. As reflected in Academy Guidelines for members, if 
questions of statutory rights between nonunion employers and 
employees are to be resolved in private dispute resolution settings, 
there should, so far as possible, be due process guarantees parallel 
to those provided in the courts, in a manner consistent with the 
Due Process Protocol. This protocol sets minimum due process 
standards for arbitration in nonunion settings. 
In this section of the report, we present the survey information 
we gathered on statutory rights and due process. We asked a 
number of questions of the respondents that related to the issue of 
APPENDIX 305 
statutory rights, the connection to due process, and attitudes of 
Academy members on these topics. 
Statutory Rights in Neutral Work 
To what extent has the increasing statutory regulation of the 
employment relationship affected the nature of an Academy 
member’s practice? About four out of five Academy members in 
our survey (82 percent) reported that they had arbitrated a dispute 
within the past three years that required them to interpret or apply 
a statute. They told us, further, that cases involving a claim of 
statutory rights now constitute about 10 percent of the total 
number of union-management cases they are arbitrating. 
Among nonunion arbitration cases, 60 percent involved claims 
of statutory rights, as did 73 percent of nonunion mediations. In 
some respects this is a tautological finding, as many of the non-
union ADR systems are set up explicitly to resolve statutory claims 
outside the normal court or agency setting. Nonetheless, it is 
noteworthy that these issues dominate the nonunion neutral work 
of Academy members, making due process protection and the 
preparation of neutrals to hear these cases even more important 
than they might otherwise be. 
Members of the Academy, and many others, have expressed 
concerns about the adequacy of representation in arbitration cases 
that involve the application of statutory rights. Table 22 provides 
evidence on this issue. Over 80 percent of the arbitrators we 
Table 22 
The Nature of Representation in Statutory Rights Arbitration Cases 
(percent of Academy members reporting frequency of type of 
representation) 
Parties represented 
by legal counsel 
Employer only 
Employee/union 
only 
Both employer and 
employee/union 
Neither employer nor 
employee/union 
Always 
4 
2 
32 
1 
Often 
20 
7 
50 
6 
Sometimes 
22 
11 
10 
13 
Seldom 
22 
29 
4 
30 
Never 
33 
52 
3 
51 
Note: Rows may not add up to 100 percent because of rounding. 
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surveyed told us that both the employer and the employee (or 
union) were represented by legal counsel “always” or “often” in 
their statutory rights arbitration cases. Conversely, about the same 
proportion told us that “seldom” or “never” were neither the 
employer nor the employee (or union) represented by legal 
counsel in their statutory cases. For those who believe that having 
a lawyer as an advocate in an arbitration proceeding is the sine qua 
non of representation, these results are probably reassuring. On 
the other hand, table 22 also shows that a significant number, albeit 
a minority, of Academy respondents have heard cases involving 
statutory rights in which one of the parties was represented by legal 
counsel but the other was not. About one-quarter of the respon-
dents, for example, say that “always” or “often” only the employer 
is represented by counsel in a statutory case. 
What statutory rights are most often at stake? In table 23 we 
present the answers to several questions regarding a specific list of 
statutes. Respondents were asked whether they had been required 
to interpret or apply each of these statutes. In addition, we asked 
the respondents whether they had received training in the sub-
stance of each statute or whether they had taught the statute. The 
respondents were also asked for their priorities for training that the 
Academy might sponsor. 
The first column of table 23 presents the actual application of 
the specific statutes in the order of their prevalence in the respon-
Table 23 
Knowledge and Application of 
Title VII 
ADA 
Federal/state/provincial 
labor relations 
FMLA 
Age Discrimination 
Employment Standards 
OSHA 
Human Rights (Canada) 
Whistle-Blower 
Canadian Charter 
Other 
Required 
Statutory Rights (percentage of 
to 
apply statute 
78 
71 
71 
61 
60 
58 
5 3 
20 
19 
5 
19 
Received training 
on statute 
33 
31 
30 
21 
26 
15 
15 
8 
5 
2 
4 
Have taught 
statute 
25 
20 
30 
14 
19 
14 
12 
7 
6 
2 
6 
respondents) 
Training 
priority (rank) 
1 
2 
3 
Note: Title VII is part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; ADA = Americans with Disabilities Act; 
OSHA = Occupational Safety and Health Act; FMLA = Family and Medical Leave Act. 
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dents’ caseloads. The rankings indicate the importance of a wide 
range of statutes, from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (78 
percent) to OSHA (53 percent). Because there were so few Cana-
dians in the sample, the small number required to apply the 
Canadian human rights code (20 percent) and the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (5 percent) significantly under-
state the importance of those statutes in Canadian arbitration 
practices. 
When we asked the respondents whether they had received or 
provided training on the same list of statutes, a similar ranking was 
revealed. In general, the most prevalent statutory applications 
were the same areas in which Academy members had sought 
training. We asked respondents whether they had provided train-
ing on each of the statutes, recognizing the substantial proportion 
of Academy members who regularly teach in university classrooms 
or possess expertise useful to training programs in the specific 
statute. There are, however, fairly significant gaps between column 
1 and the sum of columns 2 and 3. For example, while 78 percent 
have been required to interpret or apply Title VII, only 58 percent 
have received or given training that would allow a presumption of 
contemporary knowledge of the statute. 
Where do the remaining Academy members acquire their ex-
pertise on the statute? Presumably this gap in knowledge is re-
flected in the priority the members placed on training on Title VII 
matters. Similar potential gaps between required application and 
knowledge are apparent for all the other laws. The response to the 
training priority question reflects the statutes most frequently 
applied; such training would help to fill a potentially troubling lack 
of expertise. 
Due Process Outside Union-Management Arbitration 
Academy members reported strong familiarity with the Due 
Process Protocol, with 79 percent answering either 1 or 2 on a 5-
point scale ( 1 being very familiar and 5 not familiar at all). Only 7 
percent responded 4 or 5. We were curious as to whether those who 
had a caseload outside union-management arbitration were more 
or less familiar with the protocol. When we examined that question 
and compared many other subgroups of the Academy, we found 
that all groups responded similarly to the question. 
Specific aspects of procedural matters outside the world of 
union-management arbitration merit special attention in this 
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report. A debate has existed for some time as to whether fairness, 
or the appearance of fairness, is compromised when the fees of a 
neutral are paid by one party. With that in mind we asked about fee 
practices in union-management arbitration, in nonunion media-
tion and arbitration, and in nonemployment arbitration. We 
present a summary of the responses to those questions in table 24. 
The questions were not exactly the same for obvious reasons. We 
could not ask, for example, whether unions and management 
equally split the arbitration fee except in the union-management 
arena. We were, however, able to ask parallel questions for non-
union arbitration, nonunion mediation, and nonemployment 
arbitration—employer/employee equally or all parties equally. 
The table reveals some important differences in fee sources 
among the four areas of practice. To no one’s surprise, the 
dominant model in union-management arbitration is for the 
union and the employer to split arbitration fees equally. Academy 
Table 24 
Sources of Fees in Different Forums (percentage saying fees paid in this 
manner always or often) 
Employer/union 
equally 
Employer/employee 
equally 
All parties equally 
Union-
management 
arbitration 
98 
— 
— 
Nonunion 
employment 
arbitration 
— 
36 
— 
Nonunion 
employment 
mediation 
— 
51 
— 
Non-
employment 
arbitration 
— 
— 
74 
Employer/union 3 — — — 
unequally 
Employer/employee — 11 11 — 
unequally 
All parties unequally — — — 5 
Loser 
Employer alone 
Union alone 
Employee alone 
One party alone 
3 
2 
1 
2 
46 
1 
— 
33 
0 
7 
— 
11 
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members reported that fees are paid always or often in this manner 
98 percent of the time. This same practice is the dominant fee 
pattern in nonemployment arbitration, with 74 percent of the 
respondents reporting that the parties pay fees equally always or 
often. The practice in nonunion mediation and arbitration is 
different, however. There is still a significant portion of the cases 
in which fees are split equally by employers and employees—36 
percent for arbitration and 51 percent for mediation. When 
unequal splits are included, employees bear responsibility for at 
least a portion of the arbitration fee 47 percent of the time in 
arbitration and 62 percent of the time in nonunion mediation. 
An important fear of Academy members is reflected in a signifi-
cant proportion of nonunion neutral fee practices. Forty-six per-
cent of Academy members reported that employers alone paid the 
fees for nonunion arbitration always or often. When we asked 
Academy members about their attitudes toward this practice, a 
significant proportion of the respondents said that single-party 
payment unconditionally compromised the arbitration process. 
(This issue is further discussed in connection with table 27.) 
The increased involvement of Academy members in schemes of 
unequal payment by the parties has prompted an internal debate. 
It may herald a shift in traditional attitudes, reflecting a recogni-
tion that allowance must be made for the limited means of unor-
ganized employees. In Coles v. Burns International Security Services, 
105 F3rd, 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the court ruled that due process 
requires that the employer pay the full expenses of the arbitration 
when the employment contract mandates the arbitration of statu-
tory disputes. 
Another area of potential practice differences between union 
and nonunion arbitration is presented in table 25. We asked a 
series of questions about the presence of counsel in these different 
forums in an effort to determine whether employees in nonunion 
arbitration receive adequate representation. The results reveal 
only small differences between union and nonunion arbitration, 
although there are some disquieting results. The fear regarding 
nonunion employment representation patterns is that employees 
might be unrepresented while employers benefit from legal coun-
sel being present. This is the case in a significant minority of cases, 
with 22 percent of the respondents reporting this to be the practice 
always or often. 
What is surprising is that this pattern is nearly exactly the same 
in the unionized sector, with 24 percent of the respondents 
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Table 25 
Legal Representation in Union and Nonunion Arbitration (percentage of 
respondents) 
Nonunion 
Union-management arbitration employment arbitration 
Party represented 
by legal counsel 
Employer only 
Employee only 
Both employer 
and employee 
Neither side 
Always/ 
often 
24 
9 
82 
7 
Seldom/ 
never 
55 
81 
7 
81 
Always/ 
often 
22 
5 
67 
11 
Seldom/ 
never 
67 
91 
19 
78 
reporting that this occurs always or often in union-management 
arbitration. However, it is inaccurate to characterize a union 
grievant as unrepresented in the absence of legal counsel. Even if 
an attorney is not present, union members would always be repre-
sented by a union official. 
Not surprisingly, it is extremely rare in both sectors that only the 
employee would be represented, with 81 percent (union) and 91 
percent (nonunion) reporting that this happens seldom or never. 
The dominant mode for representation in both sectors is that both 
parties have counsel present, with 82 percent saying that occurs 
always or often in unionized arbitration and 67 percent reporting 
that to be the case in nonunion arbitration. As can be seen in the 
final row of table 25, it is rare for neither side to be represented in 
arbitration in either sector. While the parallel nature of the results 
in the union and nonunion worlds may belie some of the fears, 
there is still a significant minority of Academy members who report 
cases where the employer is represented by counsel and the 
employee is unrepresented. 
The respondents were asked a series of questions about the 
importance of various elements of due process, some included in 
the Due Process Protocol, some not. Table 26 presents the results 
of those questions for nonunion employment arbitration and 
nonemployment arbitration. We also asked, for many of the same 
elements, how often those elements had not been available to the 
respondents. The results are encouraging. There is a rough nega-
tive correlation between the ranking of importance and the pro-
portion of time the elements had been denied. The elements most 
important to Academy members are those least likely to be denied 
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Table 26 
Rating of Due Process Elements and Instances of Elements Denied 
(percentage of respondents) 
Nonunion employment 
arbitration 
% rating 
very important 
Right of representation 
Authority to grant 
remedies consistent 
with statute 
Authority to order production 
of documents 
Authority to administer oaths 
Neutrally administered panel 
(e.g. AAA) 
Authority to provide written 
decisions 
Subpoena power 
Authority to order remedies 
beyond compensatory 
order 
Right of discovery 
Access to prehearing 
conference 
Post-hearing briefs 
Right of deposition 
Access to court reporter 
85 
74 
69 
62 
61 
61 
58 
41 
33 
33 
28 
19 
14 
% denied 
— 
— 
5 
2 
— 
10 
8 
24 
15 
19 
28 
— 
43 
Nonemployment 
arbitration 
% rating 
very important 
78 
64 
54 
60 
53 
31 
51 
34 
38 
29 
18 
20 
12 
% denied 
— 
— 
10 
5 
— 
20 
9 
37 
19 
17 
35 
— 
42 
them in actual practice. For example, 69 percent of Academy 
members thought it very important to have the authority to order 
production of documents during the arbitration process. Only 5 
percent reported that they had been denied that right during a 
nonunion arbitration hearing. On the opposite end of the rank-
ing, 14 percent thought it very important to have access to a court 
reporter, a procedural guarantee that had been denied to 43 
percent of the members. 
Comparing the attitudes of Academy members regarding non-
union employment arbitration and nonemployment arbitration, 
one sees that members generally report the same rankings for 
those two different settings. Likewise, similar patterns of an ab-
sence of those procedures exist in the two sectors. Again, the 
procedural facets considered most important are those least likely 
to be denied in nonemployment arbitration. 
We also considered another aspect of the importance of these 
rankings in the actual practice of Academy members. We asked 
whether respondents had refused a case because of a perceived 
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lack of fairness of procedures, thus translating their beliefs into 
action. Only 17 percent of Academy members reported that they 
had done so in the case of nonunion arbitration and even fewer 
respondents (7 percent) had done so for nonemployment arbitra-
tion. Similar percentages of respondents reported that they had 
sought to have a process amended to conform to guidelines 
present in the Due Process Protocol—17 percent for nonunion 
arbitration and 6 percent for nonemployment arbitration. The 
Academy itself will have to consider the question of whether these 
responses, in sum, reflect an adequate respect for procedural 
fairness in nonunion arbitration or whether the procedural pro-
tections that were denied are important enough to consider 
strengthening member adherence to Academy guidelines. 
Other Attitudes of Academy Members 
Respondents were asked a series of questions about their atti-
tudes on various facets of arbitration and mediation. These results 
are reported in table 27. In addition to overall mean responses to 
the questions, we have also considered various subcategories of the 
Academy. 
The first column reports the results of the previously discussed 
single-payer fee question. The Academy is sharply divided on this 
question, as figure 7 highlights, and solely examining the mean 
responses covers up the extremes. Fourteen percent of the respon-
dents strongly agree that having one party pay the arbitration fee 
compromises the process. Fifteen percent strongly disagree with 
that proposition, with the remainder of the Academy almost 
equally divided into less strongly held beliefs. Interestingly enough, 
those who have worked in the nonunion arbitration sector are least 
likely to feel that one party paying the fees compromises the 
arbitration process. As can be seen in the first column of table 27, 
workplace neutrals and multineutrals are least likely to believe that 
to be the case. Regionally, Canadians believe more strongly than 
any other group that single-payer arbitration is a flawed process. 
Respondents who told us that the source of fees doesn’t matter 
offered comments along the following lines: 
“Arbitrators take pride in ensuring decisions that are based on the 
facts of the case. They protect their integrity and self-worth and I can’t 
imagine anyone would make a decision based on who’s going to pay 
the freight.” 
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Table 27 
Average Attitudes of Academy Members on Various Issues, by Practice Type, 
Region, and Gender 
Overall 
Practice Type 
Union-management 
arbitrators 
Union-only neutrals 
Workplace neutrals 
Union-management 
& nonemployment 
neutrals 
Multineutrals 
Region 
Northeast, U.S. 
North central, U.S. 
West, U.S. 
Elsewhere, U.S. 
Canada 
Gender 
Men 
Women 
Fees paid by 
one party 
compromise 
process 
2.88 
3.08 
3.41 
2.77 
3.10 
2.41 
2.98 
2.76 
2.75 
2.73 
3.81 
2.93 
2.63 
Disclose 
previous 
cases 
2.89 
2.89 
2.69 
3.36 
2.50 
2.53 
3.02 
3.03 
2.83 
2.56 
3.71 
2.81 
3.36 
Disclose previous 
relationships 
in multiparty 
dispute 
2.23 
2.31 
2.31 
2.55 
1.96 
1.93 
2.42 
2.13 
2.38 
1.87 
2.50 
2.24 
2.14 
Make settle-
ment recom-
mendations 
in mediation 
2.50 
2.65 
2.16 
2.48 
2.31 
2.76 
2.38 
2.74 
2.61 
2.44 
2.33 
2.43 
2.92 
Meet 
with 
separately 
parties to 
mediate dispute 
in arbitration 
3.95 
4.29 
3.64 
3.88 
4.03 
3.83 
3.79 
4.01 
3.98 
4.34 
2.96 
3.93 
4.09 
Note: Column 1: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree. All other columns: 1 = always; 5 = never. 
Figure 7 
Response of Academy Members: If fees are paid 
entirely by one party, the arbitration process is 
compromised. 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
15% 
Strongly Disagree 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
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“I don’t have a problem with who pays—I call it the way I see it as long 
as I get paid for it by someone.” 
“If fees must be split, access to arbitration may be limited to those with 
resources.” 
Other respondents, however, offered comments such as these: 
“The appearance of undue influence by one party taints the process.” 
“Who pays the piper calls the tune.” 
“I think we’re not all as rational as we’d like to be. It’s very likely to 
have an insidious effect on the arbitrator’s decision.” 
“You don’t bite the hand that feeds you.” 
“Even if an arbitrator is scrupulously fair, he or she must retain the 
appearance of neutrality by equal division of the fee.” 
The second column reports the practice of Academy members 
regarding the disclosure of previous cases to unions. This is seen as 
important by some members of the Academy (see figure 8) as the 
possibly misleading appearance of impartiality may be created by 
an arbitrator in a collective bargaining case who does not disclose 
that he or she has done nonunion arbitration work for the em-
ployer and could be seen as dependent upon that employer for 
future work. Those who view that as a concern believe the relevant 
union should be made aware of such prior relationships. Work-
place neutrals—those that might be in such a situation—are the 
least likely to disclose such relationships to unions in arbitration. 
Again, Canadians hold views stronger than the remainder of the 
Academy on this question. They hold the strongest belief that these 
relationships need not be disclosed. 
The third column of table 27 reports parallel questions regard-
ing disclosure in multiparty disputes—that is, whether members dis-
close to the union any cases conducted with the same employer in 
non–collective bargaining arbitration or mediation cases. It should 
be kept in mind that only 61 percent of Academy members have 
done this type of neutral work. Academy members are ambivalent 
on this question, with the mean response near the middle of the 
attitudinal scale. There are no important differences within the 
subgroupings that we report. 
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Figure 8 
Response of Academy Members: Do you 
disclose to the union any non–collective 
bargaining arbitration or mediation cases you 
conducted with the same employer? 
8% 
Seldom 
Columns 4 and 5 report the results of important stylistic differ-
ences across Academy members. Some members believe that, as a 
matter of practice, they should never make settlement recommenda-
tions in mediation. Others see this as a normal, even necessary, 
aspect of sound mediation practice. Attitudes in this area of 
practice are neutral with approximately equal proportions of 
respondents responding from always to never. 
Academy members reveal more strongly held norms on the 
question of whether they meet separately with the parties to mediate an 
arbitration dispute. According to the respondents, most never do 
this, with the overall mean being 3.95 (1=always, 5=never). While 
this practice is the norm across nearly all segments of the Academy, 
again Canadians report different practice. The Canadian respon-
dents are much more likely to meet separately with the parties in 
an attempt to mediate an arbitration dispute. 
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Conclusion: The Academy at a Crossroads 
In 1947 the National Academy of Arbitrators was conceived as an 
organization dedicated to the advancement of labor arbitration in 
the collective bargaining setting. Grievance arbitration became a 
critical part of the social contract underlying the collective bargain-
ing regime, as it substituted for recourse to strikes and lock-outs 
during the term of a collective bargaining agreement. It has, in that 
sense, come to be an essential lynchpin in industrial relations 
stability in North America. Academy members and other labor 
arbitrators resolve disputes by the application of principles that 
have evolved over decades and have become well established in a 
widely reported jurisprudence. The procedures followed by labor 
arbitrators, the principles they apply, and the remedies they direct 
are generally conciliatory and supportive of the ongoing relation-
ships that they serve. 
The arbitration of nonunion employment disputes, including 
disputes relating to the statutory rights of employees, brings 
different principles and factors to bear. More often than not they 
involve a one-time conflict flowing from the termination of a 
relationship not to be renewed. To the extent that the procedures 
followed and remedies that may result mirror those within a statute 
being applied, the adjudicator is called upon to apply an instru-
ment of public policy, vindicating individual rights in a manner 
largely unknown to the union arbitration forum. So understood, 
union arbitration and employment arbitration are substantially 
different forms of adjudication which call for different skills, 
background, and knowledge. Because of the inherent institutional 
differences between them, they may also involve different ap-
proaches to due process. 
This survey reveals that Academy members are becoming in-
creasingly active in both nonunion workplace and nonemploy-
ment adjudication. As collective bargaining has declined in North 
America and workplace arbitration among the unorganized has 
increased, the activity of Academy members in the arbitration and 
mediation of nonunion employment disputes, including disputes 
relating to statutory rights, has increased dramatically. Not surpris-
ingly, this has led to intense debate within the Academy itself. Some 
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argue that the Academy must change with the times, opening its 
membership and activities to workplace adjudicators with rela-
tively less experience in the field of collective bargaining. Others 
respond, with equal conviction, that while Academy members may 
choose to arbitrate and mediate employment disputes, the Acad-
emy should never stray from its roots, which are in collective 
bargaining. For many Academy members, the prospect of admit-
ting into membership persons who might both arbitrate as neutrals 
and advocate for employees or employers in the nonunion sector, 
and whose activities may not be constrained by codes of ethics and 
rules against solicitation deeply rooted in union arbitration, raises 
critical existential questions. Can union arbitrators and employ-
ment arbitrators coexist within the same house? Can an organiza-
tion with a justly proud history of advancing the scholarship and 
practice of union arbitration spread its focus to the practice of 
employment arbitration without compromising its soul? 
As we release this report the Academy has charged two commit-
tees with the important task of recommending future directions 
for the Academy in matters as fundamental as admission standards, 
ethical policies, ongoing training, and the content of meeting 
programs. While it is not the mandate or purpose of this report to 
recommend policy directions, it will no doubt serve as a document 
of some importance to the discussions that will take place in these 
and other committees of the Academy in the years to come. Quite 
apart from the information it provides concerning the involve-
ment of Academy members in work as neutrals outside the tradi-
tional union-management field, it serves as a critical empirical 
baseline from which the Academy can chart its progress. It provides 
a benchmark against which the Academy may follow the evolution 
of its membership, including changes in their caseloads, interests, 
and values in a society that promises to make ever greater use of 
professional neutrals as both adjudicators and mediators. 
While previous surveys of Academy members have been done 
(most recently the Bognanno and Smith report in 1988 and the 
Beck report in 1994), this survey is the most comprehensive 
undertaken to date to examine both the practice and views of 
Academy members. Its results provide an empirical basis for 
discussions within the Academy of policy issues, and most particu-
larly policy issues relating to disputes involving statutory rights in 
nonunion employment arbitration and mediation, and the in-
creasing activities of Academy members within that arena. Employ-
ment arbitration, an endeavor that was much less widely known at 
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the time most members joined the Academy, has gained substan-
tially more significance in the North American workplace and in 
recent years has nearly doubled in the activities of Academy 
members. The Bognanno-Smith and Beck reports found 24 per-
cent and 28 percent of Academy members, respectively, doing 
nonunion employment arbitrations. Now 46 percent of Academy 
members responding to this survey confirm that they have arbi-
trated cases in the employment field over the three years surveyed. 
Significantly, a further 33 percent expressed the view that they 
would accept such cases, “assuming acceptable due process protec-
tions.” More broadly, the evolution of statutes concerning work-
place rights has brought a greater involvement of Academy mem-
bers in the adjudication and mediation of statutory rights, both in 
the union and nonunion employment setting. While it is evident 
that statutory rights arise more frequently in nonunion employ-
ment arbitration, they nevertheless do comprise an important 
segment of issues decided by Academy members in arbitrations 
within the collective bargaining regime. 
To date, the depth of activities of Academy members in the 
arbitration and mediation of nonunion employment disputes has 
not been great. While it appears that for a relatively small number 
of Academy members such work is significant, if not preponderant 
within their day-to-day practice, the survey reveals that among 
Academy members who have conducted nonunion employment 
arbitrations, on average they have done fewer than three cases a 
year. However, there is every reason to believe that Academy 
members will participate more and more in the growing field of 
nonunion employment arbitration and mediation, particularly 
given that younger Academy members are more active in employ-
ment cases and that they appear to represent more lucrative work. 
On a more philosophical level, the survey offers intriguing 
insight on the startlingly disparate views of Academy members on 
sensitive issues of perceived fairness in the arbitration process. It 
may not be surprising that members steeped in the traditions of 
collective bargaining arbitration, whose fees have always been 
shared equally by both parties, consider that the payment of fees by 
a single party would compromise the arbitration process. However, 
the concept of the employer paying all of an arbitrator’s fees in the 
context of a nonunion employment arbitration, which has re-
ceived express judicial approval (Cole v. Burns International Security 
Services, 105 F. 3rd 1465, D.C.Cir. 1997), plainly does not offend 
those members of the Academy who have done nonunion employ-
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ment arbitrations and mediations, where such arrangements are 
commonplace. Interestingly, when surveyed on this question, 
Academy members are evenly divided across the spectrum, as to 
whether they view the payment of a neutral’s fee by a single party 
to be a factor that compromises the process. 
The demographic picture the survey draws will no doubt give 
some analysts cause for concern. Apart from the average age of 
Academy members being at a relatively high 63, the data reveal that 
women and minorities appear to be substantially underrepresented 
in Academy membership whether by comparison with the popula-
tion generally or with other professions. These findings should be 
of interest to agencies involved in the recruitment and develop-
ment of professional neutrals, and to Academy members involved 
in mentoring. 
Just as a periodic census is an instrument essential to the 
informed administration of a city or nation, an organization 
concerned with its vitality should know as much as possible about 
its own current makeup. We submit this report as a contribution to 
a more informed discussion and debate of important issues that 
face the Academy and as a document of interest to all who value and 
respect the role of professional neutrals. We believe that that view 
is deeply shared by the members of the Academy, as reflected in 
their remarkable rate of participation in the survey leading to this 
report, of which they are the true authors. 
References 
Bingham, Lisa B., and Denise R. Chachere. 1999. “Dispute Resolution in 
Employment: The Need for Research.” In Employment Dispute Resolution 
and Worker Rights in the Changing Workplace, ed. Adrienne E. Eaton and 
Jeffery H. Keefe. Industrial Relations Research Association Series. 
Champaign-Urbana: University of Illinois, pp. 95–135. 
Dunlop, John T., and Arnold M. Zack. 1997. Mediation and Arbitration of 
Employment Disputes. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Lipsky, David B., and Ronald L. Seeber. 1998A.The Appropriate Resolution 
of Corporate Disputes: A Report on the Growing Use of ADR by U.S. Corpora-
tions. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell/PERC Institute on Conflict Resolution, Cornell 
University. 
———. 1998B. “In Search of Control: The Corporate Embrace of ADR.” 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment Law 1, no. 1 
(spring): 133–57. 
320 ARBITRATION 2000 
Miller, Paul Steven. 1995. “EEOC Adopts ADR Methods.” Dispute Resolu-
tion Journal, Oct.–Dec., pp. 17 and 87. 
Sherwyn, David, J. Bruce Tracey, and Zev J. Eigen. 1999. “In Defense of 
Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Toss-
ing Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process.” 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment Law 2, no. 1 
(spring): 73–150. 
U.S. Department of Labor. 1994. Report and Recommendations: Commission 
on the Future of Worker-Management Relations [“Dunlop Commission”]. 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December. 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 1995. “Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Policy Statement,” July 17. 
U.S. General Accounting Office. 1997. Alternative Dispute Resolution: Em-
ployers’ Experiences with ADR in the Workplace. 
Zack, Arnold M. 1999. “Agreements to Arbitrate and the Waiver of Rights 
under Employment Law.” In Employment Dispute Resolution and Worker Rights 
in the Changing Workplace, ed. Adrienne E. Eaton and Jeffery H. Keefe. 
Industrial Relations Research Association Series. Champaign-Urbana: 
University of Illinois, pp. 67–94. 
Previous Academy Surveys 
in chronological order 
“Survey of the Arbitration Profession in 1952.” 1954. Appendix E, in The 
Profession of Labor Arbitration: Cumulative Selection of Addresses at First Seven 
Annual Meetings, National Academy of Arbitrators, 1948 through 1954, ed. 
Jean T. McKelvey. Washington, D.C.: BNA Books, pp. 176–82. 
“Research and Education Committee Report and Recommendations.” 
1959. Appendix D, and “Statistical Tables Based on the Survey of Arbi-
tration Work of Members of the Academy in 1957,” Appendix E, in Arbi-
tration and the Law, Proceedings of the 12th Annual Meeting, National Academy 
of Arbitrators, ed. Jean T. McKelvey. Washington, D.C.: BNA Books, pp. 
179–90. 
“Survey of Arbitration in 1962.” 1964. Appendix C, in Labor Arbitration— 
Perspectives and Problems: Proceedings of the 17th Annual Meeting, National 
Academy of Arbitrators, ed. Mark L. Kahn. Washington, D.C.: BNA Books, 
pp. 292–316. 
[Jean T. McKelvey and Derek L. Rogers]. 1971. “Survey of the Arbitration 
Profession in 1968.” In Arbitration and the Public Interest: Proceedings of the 
24th Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators, ed. Barbara Den-
APPENDIX 321 
nis and Gerald G. Somers. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 
p . 275. 
Petersen, Donald J., and Julius Rezler. 1977. “Fee Setting and Other 
Administrative Practices of Labor Arbitrators: Study by Professors 
Petersen and Rezler of Loyola University of Chicago.” In Awards of Arbi-
trators, Reports of Fact-Finding Boards, Court Decisions on Labor Arbitration, 68 
LA 1383. 
[Michael F. Bognanno and Clifford E. Smith]. 1989. “The Demograph-
ics and Professional Characteristics of Arbitrators in North America.” In 
Emerging Issues for the 1990s: Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting, National 
Academy of Arbitrators, ed. Gladys W. Gruenberg. Washington, D.C.: Bu-
reau of National Affairs, p . 266. 
[Michael H. Beck, Chair]. 1994. “Report of the Committee to Consider 
the Academy’s Role, If Any, with Regard to Alternative Labor Dispute 
Resolution Procedures.” In Arbitration 1993: Arbitration and the Changing 
World of Work—Proceedings of the 46th Annual Meeting, National Academy of 
Arbitrators, ed. Gladys W. Gruenberg. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Na-
tional Affairs, p . 325. 
